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Abstract
This paper studies a social planner who chooses countries’ carbon prices so as to
maximize global welfare. Product markets are characterized by firm heterogeneity,
market power, and international trade. Because of the market-power distortion, the
planner’s optimal policy is second-best. The main insight is that optimal carbon
prices may be highly asymmetric: zero in some countries and above the social cost
of carbon in countries with relatively dirty production. This result obtains even
though a uniform global carbon price is always successful at reducing countries’
emissions. Competition policy that mitigates market power may enable stronger
and more balanced climate action.
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1 Introduction
Carbon pricing is increasingly being used as a key policy instrument to combat climate
change. Yet carbon prices around the world remain low and uneven: around €30 per
ton of CO2 in Europe’s flagship cap-and-trade system—and even higher for some national
carbon taxes—but much lower in most other jurisdictions (World Bank 2020). This
picture stands in marked contrast to the Pigouvian ideal of a uniform global carbon price
set at the social cost of carbon (SCC).
So far, carbon pricing has focused on power generation and emissions-intensive indus-
trial sectors like aluminium, cement and steel. Three characteristics of these regulated
industries are striking. First, firms within each industry often have widely varying car-
bon intensities of production. This enhances the potential for market-based regulation
to achieve significant gains in abatement-cost efficiency. Second, emissions-intensive in-
dustries are often highly concentrated with long-standing concerns about the exercise of
market power. This makes relevant the theory of the second best. Third, international
trade is important as the scope of the product market in which regulated firms compete
is often wider than that of the carbon price they face. This has lead to concerns about
the potential for leakage of emissions to less regulated jurisdictions.
This paper studies the optimal design of carbon prices in a model in which these three
characteristics are crucial. The model considers a social planner who chooses countries’
carbon prices so as to maximize global welfare. Because of a market-power distortion in
the product market, the planner’s optimal policy is second-best. The central trade-off is
that a a higher carbon price reduces a country’s domestic emissions but also increases
deadweight losses in the product market (due to pass-through of carbon costs to con-
sumers) and leads to a degree of carbon leakage to the other country.1 Thereby, the coun-
try with relatively clean firms is more vulnerable to carbon leakage as a policy-induced
loss in production to the dirtier country translates into a larger increase in emissions. In
the special case without market power and without carbon leakage, the planner sets a
uniform global carbon price at the SCC, restoring the first-best outcome.
The main insight is that second-best carbon prices can be highly asymmetric across
countries. Market power, on its own, pushes countries’ optimal carbon prices downwards
as the planner seeks to cushion the increase in consumer prices. The presence of interna-
tional trade introduces a further effect: if carbon leakage for the country with relatively
clean firms is sufficiently pronounced, its optimal carbon price is zero. This, in turn, limits
deadweight losses in the product market and enables the planner to choose a higher carbon
price for the dirtier country—–which creates additional climate benefits as it reshuffles
1The leakage channel in the model arises from the market-share losses of more tightly regulated firms.
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production to cleaner firms. As long as market power is not too pronounced, the dirtier
country’s optimal carbon price may lie above the SCC. This finding obtains even though
a uniform global carbon price is always successful in reducing countries’ emissions.
The result should not be overplayed given the model’s very simple welfare function.2
The more general point is that, while carbon prices around the world today are almost
certainly far too low, failing to implement a uniform global carbon price does not nec-
essarily imply the wrong response to climate change. Moreover, competition policy to
mitigate market power may also enable stronger and more balanced climate action.
Related literature. This paper relates to several strands of literature on the theory of
environmental economics. First, when climate action is exogenously restricted to a subset
of countries, it is second-best for those countries to set lower carbon prices for sectors with
internationally-traded products—unless corrective trade tariffs are available (Hoel 1996).
This paper, by contrast, endogenizes the extent of climate action across all countries and
is concerned with cross-country (rather than cross-sectoral) differences in carbon prices.
Second, with imperfect competition in product markets, the optimal emissions price
typically falls short of the Pigouvian rule (Buchanan 1969). This theory applies to local
environmental problems in which a government sets a single domestic emissions price. This
paper studies second-best carbon prices that maximize global welfare in an international
context in which each country may set a different carbon price.3,4
Third, cross-country differences in marginal abatement costs can be optimal due
to equity concerns: a less rich country may have a higher marginal utility of income
(Chichilnisky & Heal 1994). This result can be interpreted as a second-best policy due to
restrictions on international financial transfers. This paper directly characterizes coun-
tries’ carbon prices and obtains an extreme version of non-uniform pricing in a model
without equity concerns.
2 Model
Consider a global industry in which nk ≥ 1 firm(s) are based in country k = i, j. Firm
m from country k produces xmk units of output with an emissions intensity zk ≡ emk /xmk ,




k (k = i, j). The global demand curve
2The model considers a partial-equilibrium setting without further distortions in factor markets or
wider tax interactions. The social planner does not have access to additional policy instruments (e.g.,
output subsidies) to directly address the market-power distortion.
3A second-best domestic emissions tax can exceed social cost if the demand curve is highly convex or if
this alleviates the problem of “excess entry” by firms. Neither consideration arises in the present model.
See Requate (2006) for a valuable survey of environmental regulation under imperfect competition.
4Babiker (2005) finds carbon leakage rates up to 130% in a general-equilibrium model with similar
ingredients to the present paper but does not study countries’ optimal carbon prices.
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k = i, j). Firms have constant unit costs, which are set to zero to facilitate the exposition.




k − τkemk .5
The product market features a generalized version of Cournot competition. The con-
duct parameter θ ∈ (0, 1] indexes the intensity of competition. Formally, firms’ equilib-
rium outputs (x̂mk )k=i,j satisfy:


















Firm m in country k, in deviating its output by (xmk − x̂mk ), conjectures that industry
output will change by θ(xmk − x̂mk ) as a result. In this “conduct equilibrium” (Weyl &
Fabinger 2013), a lower θ corresponds to more intense competition while θ > 0 means
that competition is imperfect. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where θ = 1.
Profit-maximization implies that, for each firm, a generalized version of marginal rev-
enue, p − θxmk , is equal to its marginal carbon cost, zkτk. Equivalently, its marginal
abatement cost (p− θxmk )/zk equals the carbon price. Let Xk(τi, τj) and Ek(τi, τj) denote
outputs and emissions in this product-market equilibrium.
Global welfare W = U − sE reflects consumer utility U ≡
∫ X
0
p(v)dv and the global
SCC, s.6 The social planner’s problem is to maxτi,τjW (τi, τj) subject to the constraint
that firms make non-negative profits, Πmk ≥ 0 (k = i, j). Assume that W (0, 0) > 0 so the
market is socially viable without carbon pricing—and the planner therefore never shuts it
down. A necessary condition for this is that some consumers’ willingness-to-pay exceeds
environmental damages, α > smax{zi, zj}.7
3 Carbon prices and global emissions
The first results characterize basic properties of carbon pricing. The rate of carbon leakage





5The assumption of constant emissions intensities is a common and useful benchmark in the literature.
Similar insights would obtain in a richer model with end-of-pipe abatement. Production costs being
equal across firms and countries switches off the welfare channel that carbon pricing can affect industry
production-cost efficiency (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz 2013) so as to focus sharply on consumer welfare and
climate damages.
6Product-market revenues are a transfer from consumers to firms, carbon-pricing revenues are a trans-
fer from firms to governments, and production costs are zero.
7It is easy to construct examples in which carbon pricing makes socially viable a market that—given
the SCC—was otherwise not, with W (τi, τj) > 0 > W (0, 0) for some τi, τj > 0.
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This measures the fraction of i’s emissions reduction that leaks to j. Also define output
leakage LOi ≡ (dXj/dτi)/(−dXi/dτi).
Lemma 1 An increase in country i’s carbon price τi reduces its domestic production,
dXi/dτi < 0 and its domestic emissions, dEi/dτi < 0, where:
(a) the rate of output leakage LOi = nj/(nj + θ) > 0;
(b) the rate of carbon leakage LCi = (zj/zi)[nj/(nj + θ)] > 0;
(c) carbon cost pass-through dp(τi, τj)/dτi = [ni/(ni + nj + θ)] zi > 0.
Output leakage is more pronounced with (i) more rivals in j engaging in “business
stealing” from those in i as a result of the unilateral cost increase (higher nj); and (ii)
more competitive conduct (lower θ).
Carbon leakage equals output leakage scaled by the relative emissions intensity zj/zi.
A higher carbon price by i increases in global emissions if its carbon leakage exceeds 100%.
This is ruled out by symmetry but occurs if j’s production is sufficiently more polluting.8
Carbon pricing reduces i’s profit margin as less than 100% of its carbon cost is passed
on to consumers; pass-through decreases with market power and with more rivals in j.
Global action “works” in the following sense:
Lemma 2 An increase in a uniform global carbon price (τk = τ for k = i, j):
(a) reduces global emissions, dE(τ, τ)/dτ < 0;
(b) reduces country k’s emissions, dEk(τ, τ)/dτ ≤ 0, if and only if LCk ≤ 1.
A uniform tightening in carbon prices is always successful at reducing aggregate
emissions—even if it may induce higher emissions by an individual country. Intuitively,
if unilateral action by i has carbon leakage above 100%, then i’s firms are significantly
cleaner than j’s so a higher global carbon price improves their competitiveness and they
expand production and emissions.9
4 Carbon prices and global welfare
Now consider the second-best carbon prices chosen by a social planner. At a global level,
carbon pricing involves a trade-off between lower consumer utility and the potential for
8Large intra-industry heterogeneity is borne out in practice (Lyubich, Shapiro & Walker 2018).
9A direct corollary is that global carbon pricing may not achieve the lowest global emissions. To
illustrate, suppose that i and j each have a carbon price of zero or the SCC. Due to the linearity of
emissions in carbon prices, the model exhibits the property that countries’ emissions reductions are
additive. Letting ∆E(τi, τj) ≡ [E(τi, τj)− E(0, 0)], unilateral action and coordinated action are related
according to:
∆E(s, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both i and j tighten
= ∆E(s, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i tightens unilaterally
+ ∆E(0, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j tightens unilaterally
< 0,
So the inability of i’s carbon price to reduce global emissions (∆E(s, 0) > 0) is just the flipside of unilateral
carbon pricing achieving lower global emissions than a global carbon price (∆E(0, s) < ∆E(s, s) < 0).
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lower environmental damages. Under some conditions, the former dominates:









then a zero carbon price is welfare-dominant, W (0, τj) ≥ W (τi, τj) for all τi, τj ≥ 0 .
The result is immediate if i’s carbon leakage exceeds 100%. Then a “reverse leakage”
argument applies: a reduction in i’s carbon price raises its own emissions but this is
outweighed by the induced reduction in j’s emissions—so global emissions decline. As
consumers also gain, global welfare rises. Because its leakage rate is constant, this logic
holds at any level of countries’ carbon prices. Put simply, the extent of i’s carbon leakage
precludes any effective climate action by way of carbon pricing for its firms.
This conclusion applies as long as i’s leakage rate is sufficiently high, LCi ≥ LCi , where
LCi < 1 because of market power, θ > 0. The critical value L
C
i declines with the ratio α/s,
which is a measure of the size of market-power distortion (via α) relative to the climate
problem (via s).10 If the former is sufficiently important, LCi turns negative.
The main interest of the paper lies in global carbon price asymmetry, so suppose that
i’s firms are cleaner with zi/zj < 1. The next result shows how the problem is then
resolved by the three industry characteristics described in the introduction:
Lemma 4 Suppose that country i’s carbon price τi = 0. Then an interior solution τ
∗
j > 0
























international competition & firm heterogeneity
.
The first deviation of τ ∗j from the SCC is driven by market power. The standard
result that a second-best domestic emissions tax is below social cost is nested where





= [s − (θ/nj) (α/zj − s)] < s (recalling that
α > smax{zi, zj}). With perfect competition, τ ∗j
∣∣
ni=0,θ=0
= s follows the Pigouvian rule.
The second deviation from the SCC instead pushes τ ∗j upwards—driven by firm het-
erogeneity and cross-border competition. An increase in j’s carbon price shifts production
to i’s cleaner firms. This has two implications. First, output leakage to i limits the con-
traction in industry output due to j’s carbon price, mitigating the incremental product-
market distortion. Second, the contraction in industry output leads to a greater reduction
10The initial p(0, 0) = θα/(ni + nj + θ) > 0 so DWL(0, 0) =
1
2 [p(0, 0)]
2 increases with α.
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in global emissions precisely because i’s firms are cleaner. These factors limit deadweight
losses and amplify environmental benefits, pushing upwards j’s optimal carbon price.
A related observation is that the social planner regards countries’ carbon prices as
strategic substitutes.11 A higher carbon price by j raises the product price and so exacer-
bates the market-power distortion. This sharpens the planner’s trade-off against emissions
cuts by i, and reduces the welfare gain from i’s own carbon price.
The main result shows how this international-competition effect can dominate the
planner’s calculus and yield extreme asymmetry in global carbon prices:




[(ni + θ)(ni + θ) + nj(ni + nj + θ)]
≡ δ < 1.
























i’s second-best carbon price τ ∗i = 0 while j’s satisfies τ
∗
j ∈ [s, s[1 + (ni/θ)(1− zi/zj]] .
Proposition 1 establishes in equilibrium the logic underlying Lemmas 3 and 4. The
range on α/s ensures that, on one hand, the market-power distortion is small enough for
τ ∗j to exceed the SCC by Lemma 4 but, on the other hand, it is also large enough for j’s
firms to remain profitable at a very high carbon price.12 The condition zi/zj ≤ δ ensures
that indeed τ ∗i = 0 because i’s leakage is sufficiently pronounced as per Lemma 3.
To illustrate, let ni = nj = 3, θ =
1
2
, zj = 1, and s = 50. Competitive conduct then lies
“half-way” between Cournot-Nash and perfect competition, broadly in line with empirical
estimates for many industrial markets. Suppose that i’s firms are modestly cleaner with
zi = 0.9; Proposition 1’s condition becomes zi ≤ δ = 121127 and is therefore met. With
α = 600, j’s optimal carbon price is τ ∗j = 73
1
3
by Lemma 4—almost 50% above the SCC.
If instead α = 560, τ ∗j = 80 makes j’s firms just indifferent about being active while τ
∗
j
remains above the SCC as long as α ≤ 740. For these parameter values, LCi = .952 and
LCj = .771 (independent of the value of α, by Lemma 1), confirming that the result does
not hinge on carbon leakage exceeding 100% so global action works as per Lemma 2.13
























since dX/dτi, dEi/dτi and L
C
i are all constants, dp/dτj > 0, and dX/dτi < 0 (Lemma 1).
12Note that i’s firms are always profitable given that τ∗i = 0.
13For α < 560, Lemma 4’s τ∗j violates the constraint Π
m
j ≥ 0 so the planner instead chooses the highest
τj such that Π
m
j = 0. For α > 740, τ
∗
j remains interior as per Lemma 4 until it becomes zero for α ≥ 1040.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Faced with a carbon price τk, the first-order condition for firm m
in country k, which satisfies (1), is:
(p− zkτk)− θxmk = 0. (3)
Summing over all ni + nj firms shows that the industry output and product price are
equal to:
X(τi, τj) =
ni(α− ziτi) + nj(α− zjτj)
(ni + nj + θ)
and p(τi, τj) =
θα + niziτi + njzjτj
(ni + nj + θ)
. (4)
The optimality conditions (3) imply Xi = ni (α−X − ziτi) /θ for i and so:
Xi(τi, τj) =
ni
(ni + nj + θ)
[








For part (a), this pins down the output responses to i’s own carbon price as well as to j’s:
dXi
dτi
= − ni(nj + θ)
θ(ni + nj + θ)





θ(ni + nj + θ)
zj > 0 (6)
So output leakage equals LOi ≡ (dXj/dτi)/(−dXi/dτi) = nj/(nj + θ). For part (b), in
terms of emissions, using the definition Ek ≡ zkXk (k = i, j),
dEi
dτi
= − ni(nj + θ)
θ(ni + nj + θ)





θ(ni + nj + θ)
zizj > 0. (7)
So carbon leakage rate LCi ≡ (dEj/dτi)/(−dEi/dτi) = (zj/zi)[nj/(nj + θ)]. Finally, for
part (c), carbon cost pass-through follows directly from (4).
Proof of Lemma 2. For part (a), using (5) and Ek ≡ zkXk (k = i, j), global emissions
E ≡ Ei + Ej are given by:
E(τi, τj) =
α (nizi + njzj)
(ni + nj + θ)
− nizi [(nj + θ)zi − njzj]
θ(ni + nj + θ)
τi −
njzj [(ni + θ)zj − nizi]
θ(ni + nj + θ)
τj (8)
For the special case with equal carbon prices τi = τj = τ , this becomes:
E(τ, τ) =
α (nizi + njzj)
(ni + nj + θ)
− [nizi [(nj + θ)zi − njzj] + njzj [(ni + θ)zj − nizi]]
θ(ni + nj + θ)
τ
=
α (nizi + njzj)
(ni + nj + θ)
−
[








θ(ni + nj + θ)
τ (9)
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so that dE(τ, τ)/dτ < 0 holds for any values of firms’ emissions intensities zi,zj. For part
(b), using (5) and Ei ≡ ziXi for country i, say, and again imposing τi = τj = τ shows
that dEi(τ, τ)/dτ ≤ 0 holds if and only if nj/(nj + θ) ≤ zi/zj. Using Lemma 1(b), this is
the same condition as that for LCi ≤ 1.




sE(τi, τj) and the definition of the carbon leakage rate L
C
i , the impact of a change in
country i’s carbon price satisfies:
dW
dτi































where the last line uses (4) and (7) from the proof of Lemma 1. Apart from p(τi, τj), all
terms on the right-hand side are constants with respect to carbon prices, and, by Lemma
1(c), carbon cost pass-through is positive, dp/dτk > 0 for k = i, j, so for any τi, τj ≥ 0












Using p(0, 0) = θα/(ni + nj + θ) from (4) and rearranging shows that if L
C
i ≥ LCi then
dW (τi, τj)/dτi ≤ 0 and so W (0, τj) ≥ W (τi, τj) for all τi, τj ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. By assumption, τi = 0 for country i and the optimal τ
∗
j > 0 for
country j is interior so it solves the analogous expression to (12):
dW
dτj














where dX/dτj < 0 by Lemma 1 and using L
C
j = (zi/zj)[ni/(ni+θ)]. By (4), the equilibrium
product price satisfies:




(ni + nj + θ)
. (15)










































































and some further rearranging gives the expression as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof has three steps. First, to identify conditions under
which τ ∗j ≥ s. Second, to identify conditions under which j’s firms remain profitable
under this τ ∗j . Third, to obtain a condition under which τ
∗
i = 0 is indeed optimal.
Step 1. Suppose that τ ∗i = 0 and that optimal τ
∗
j > 0 for country j is interior. If so, then
τ ∗j satisfies the expression in Lemma 4, and therefore τ
∗






























ni + nj + θ
θ
)
(zj − zi) ≡ A. (20)
Step 2. By the first-order condition in (3), j’s firms remain profitable (with Πmj ≥ 0)
under this τ ∗j as long as p(0, τ
∗











































Step 3. By Lemma 3, LCi ≥ LCi is a sufficient condition for τ ∗i = 0 to be optimal for the















































[(ni + θ)(ni + θ) + nj(ni + nj + θ)]
≡ δ < 1. (27)
In summary, whenever α/s exceeds B, and also exceeds C given that zi/zj ≤ δ, τ ∗i = 0
is indeed optimal and j’s firms remain profitable under the τ ∗j of Lemma 4 which, as long






(zj − zi) > 0. (28)
The maximum value given by τ ∗j = s[1 + (ni/θ)(1 − zi/zj)] occurs where j’s are just
indifferent about being active at α/s = B.
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